Abstract. An independent component recovery approach for intrusion tolerance is proposed in this paper. Virtual Machines (VMs) are used to provide each online replica with an independent backup replica. The recovery of each component depends on the actual service state. A strict execution order is not needed to create VMs, destroy VMs and synchronize state data. The approach improves the flexibility of components of the system. In addition, for preventing the state data from losing during the recovery of replicas, a set of virtual storages, which can be connected or disconnected with online servers quickly, are used for storing the state data. A fixed cycle is set for synchronizing the state data independently. A prototype is implemented in the OpenStack cloud platform. Experimental results show that the approach improves the continuity and security of the services.
Introduction
Modern life is becoming more and more dependent on network applications. It is very important for us to protect the applications from being intruded. At present, perimeter protection techniques such as firewalls, access control, encryption and intrusion detection [1] are the major methods for protecting the application systems. However, studies have shown that it is difficult to eliminate vulnerabilities in an application system, and it is not enough to only use these techniques for protecting applications [2] . In the past few years, a novel technique called intrusion tolerance has been proposed to address network security problems. Its goal is to guarantee the correct behavior of a system even if some of its components are compromised by an intelligent adversary [3] . Intrusion tolerance uses redundancy, diversity, recovery and other defense mechanisms to build survivable systems. So far, significant progress has been made in the research about intrusion tolerance, but there are still some problems to be solved. For examples, transferring state information effectively between replicas of an intrusion tolerance system is a fatal problem for the continuity of services. A better solution for recovery is required to improve the flexibility of application systems.
An intrusion tolerance recovery approach based on independent components is proposed to address above problems. By calculating recovery time of each component respectively, the dependencies between different components are reduced. In addition, a set of independent virtual storages are used to store the state data. These virtual storages prevent state data from losing during the recovery of VMs by connecting and disconnecting them with online VMs.
Related works
Intrusion tolerance has attracted great attention over the last decade. SITAR is a classic intrusion tolerance model which uses redundancy, diversity and voting to protect the security of the system [4] . MAFTIA [5] is a middleware-based intrusion tolerance solution that helps survivability. b) Reactive state synchronization. Drawing lessons from the reactive recovery of replicas, ICRIT imports the reactive policy into state data synchronization. ICRIT accepts the abnormal state data of the storage in a short time, which takes the performance and security of the system into consideration. Frequent state synchronization is useless for restoring the system back to the normal state when a replica is compromised, and less synchronization is not conducive to the security of the system. We assume that R is the anomaly number that a PSS can tolerant. RSS records all updating commands of replicas and the updating results of the PSS in a log, then marks the anomaly number of each PSS. Once a PSS's anomaly number reaches R, the PSS will be synchronized by RSS.
Table. 2. Logs in RSS
State synchronization algorithm. The logs recorded by RSS determinate which part of the state data of a PSS should be synchronized. RSS records updating commands and each PSS's updating results. If a PSS's updating result to an updating command is right, RSS will mark the result of the PSS to the updating command as 1. Otherwise, it marks the result of the PSS to the updating command as 0. Table 2 is samples of the RSS's logs. We assume that there are four storages named {S1, S2, S3, S4}. The updating results of updating command where ID equals 1 are {1, 1, 0, 1}.It means that the updating result of S3 is anomaly. Therefore, the synchronization of the updating command should only occurs between RSS and S3.
For a long-lived system, its state data should be very large. Synchronizing all the data during every recovery may impact the performance and continuity of the system. Therefore, a timestamp is used for limiting the size of the state data which is synchronized. The timestamp is recorded by RSS every certain time, and RSS ensures that all state synchronizations have been executed.
Analysis and Experiment
Security Analysis. The recovery of replicas in ICRIT is decided by the voting result of Voter. Assuming that there are N replicas(N meets 3f+1 of the Byzantine protocol). If only the number of anomaly replicas is less than N/3, the voted results will keep right.
The recovery mechanism of ICRIT is proactive-reactive. Therefore, the time of invading the system is limited. Replicas will be recovered after running for a period T to eliminate unconscious invasion, which makes the work done by an adversary useless. Besides, by recovering periodically, the recovery time of all replicas is distributed in the time T, and one replica will be taken offline in each T/N time. Therefore, the adversary must invade at least N/3+1 replicas in (N/3) * (T/N) time. Otherwise one of replicas that he invaded is sure to be taken offline.
If the system can't be confirmed whether a replica is compromised and S recovery is triggered m times according to the reactive recovery algorithm proposed in the paper, the time for the adversary will be reduced to (N/3)*(T*(n-m)/n). It is clear that the more S recovery is triggered, the less time for the adversary is remained. If an intrusion can be detected, a D recovery will be triggered and a process will be activated to take the online replica offline directly.
The analysis above shows that the number of replicas in ICRIT is proportional to the system security. When there are only less VMs, the number of triggering S recovery is set to 1. The reactive recovery process is the same as other systems, which avoids the adversary to accomplish his goal of compromising the system if the running time of the VM is shrunk instead of taken offline.
The usage of CPU and time. 
Conclusion
This paper proposed an independent component recovery approach for intrusion tolerance. The combination of proactive and reactive recovery in the cloud environment was designed in order to increase the overall performance and resilience of intrusion-tolerant systems. Virtual machines are used to provide each online replica with an independent backup. Replicas' state data is stored in independent PSSs which can be quickly connected or disconnected with replicas. Therefore, the independence and security of the state data are improved. At the same time, the approach takes the state data of updated results as the basis of triggering reactive recovery, and further improves the security of the system. In addition, because our approach does not need to synchronize state data every time an abnormity occurs, the CPU usage and the time cost for data synchronization are reduced. In the future work, adjusting the number of servers dynamically may be considered on the basis of the ICRIT architecture, and the better algorithm of optimizing reactive recovery is needed.
